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We describe virus isolation, full genome sequence 
analysis, and clinical pathology in ferrets experimentally 
inoculated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus recovered 
from a clinically ill captive cheetah that had minimal human 
contact. Evidence of reverse zoonotic transmission by 
fomites underscores the substantial animal and human 
health implications of this virus.
Case Report
In November 2009, during the surge of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 cases among humans and ≈7 months after 
A/California/04/2009(H1N1) was ﬁ   rst reported in a 
child in southern California (1), nasal swab specimens 
from a cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus) were submitted to the 
California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory. The 
8-year-old cheetah, referred to as animal D, belonged to a 
privately operated wild animal park in northern California. 
The animal park veterinarian collected the specimens from 
animal D for diagnostic testing after severe respiratory 
symptoms, ptyalism, anorexia, and lethargy were observed 
in the animal and 3 other cheetahs housed in the same 
area. The 4 animals had been showing clinical signs of an 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness the previous week and were being 
treated with a combination of amoxicillin, enroﬂ  oxacin, 
famotidine, and omeprazole.
At the recommendation of a volunteer worker who 
was professionally afﬁ   liated with the California Public 
Health Department, a nasal swab sample was obtained 
from animal D 2–3 days following the onset of clinical 
signs. The California Public Health Department supplied 
a sampling kit consisting of cotton-tipped swabs, viral 
transport media, and a shipping container. A swab sample 
also was obtained from animal C, another 8-year-old 
cheetah, ≈4–6 days after it showed clinical signs. At the 
time of sampling, the remaining 2 cheetahs (animals A 
and B), which were housed in a separate but conjoining 
area, had clinically recovered from their respiratory illness. 
To avoid the additional handling and sedation required 
for sample collection from the nondomesticated animals, 
park personnel decided not to collect samples from the 
recovered cats.
The nasal swab samples were processed according 
to a standardized procedure distributed by the United 
States Department of Agriculture National Veterinary 
Services Laboratory through the National Animal Health 
Laboratory Network. The protocol used was an approved 
deviation of the standard operating procedure used for 
testing swine in the United States. In brief, RNA was 
recovered by using the MagMAX Viral RNA Isolation 
Kit (Applied Biosystems, Austin, TX, USA) following 
the manufacturer’s recommendations. Real-time reverse 
transcription PCR (qRT-PCR) individually targeting the 
inﬂ  uenza A matrix (M) gene and the neuraminidase (N1) 
gene were performed as described (2). Positive qRT-PCR 
test results, with cycle thresholds of 26.83 and 30.23 for 
the M and N1 genes, respectively, were obtained for animal 
D. PCR results were conﬁ  rmed as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus by sequence analysis of the PCR amplicon. Animal C 
had negative test results for M and N1 genes.
A second aliquot of the nasal sample from animal 
D was inoculated onto trypsin-treated MDCK cells 
(3), and the propagated cytolytic virus was forwarded 
to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital for complete 
genome sequence analysis. The inﬂ   uenza virus isolate 
was inoculated into ferrets for further characterization of 
the virus. The United States Department of Agriculture 
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (Ames, Iowa, 
USA) was additionally provided an aliquot of the nasal 
swab specimen. Sequence analyses of the M, N1, and 
hemagglutinin genes were performed (GenBank accession 
nos. HMO12479, HMO 12480, and HMO12481) and 
conﬁ   rmed the initial diagnostic detection of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus.
Whole genome sequencing was performed by using 
methods recommended by the World Health Organization 
(www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/swineflu/
sequencing_primers/en/). Sequence analysis conﬁ  rmed the 
existence of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (A/Cheetah/
California/D0912239/2009, GenBank accession nos. 
CY092750–CY092757). No unique molecular signatures 
were detected in the cheetah virus as compared with other 
pandemic subtype H1N1 viruses isolated from humans. 
Except for 1 synonymous base-pair mismatch at position 
1440 in the hemagglutinin gene, the sequence data matched 
in the 3 genes sequenced in 2 locations.
To characterize and further assess the pathogenicity 
proﬁ  le of the virus, we inoculated 3 groups of 5 ferrets each 
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of A/Cheetah/California/D0912239/2009 or one of the 
representative strains from humans, A/Tennessee/1–560/09 
and A/Ukraine/N6/2009. Animal studies were approved by 
the St. Jude Animal Care and Use Committee (protocol 
428) and were conducted according to applicable laws and 
guidelines. Ferrets were observed daily, and temperature 
and weight measurements and nasal washes were obtained 
for analysis on day 0 and on postexposure days 3, 5, and 7. 
Weight measurements were performed until day 14.
In all 3 groups, viral shedding was detected on 
days 3 and 5, with the virus being cleared by day 7. The 
concentration of shed virus ranged from a 103.5 to a 106.3 
tissue culture infectious doses for all 3 tested viruses; 
differences in the measured virus concentration were not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant (Figure). Slight elevations in body 
temperature were detected in each group. The bodyweight 
per day for each ferret was analyzed as the percentage of the 
original weight; with all 3 viruses, the highest weight loss 
occurred within the ﬁ  rst 7 days after inoculation. Overall, 
the clinical and virologic course of infection did not differ 
substantially between infecting viruses (Table).
Conclusions
The pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was recovered from 
a captive cheetah showing clinical signs compatible with 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness. Approximately 7 days before onset 
of clinical signs in 2 of the 4 affected cheetahs (animals 
C and D, the animals affected last), it was reported that 
an animal caregiver, who was not in direct contact with 
the cheetahs but who had contact with their food and 
environment, had inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms for 2 days before 
taking sick leave from work. Attempts to retrospectively 
conﬁ  rm the presence of the novel subtype H1N1 virus in 
this particular worker were not successful, as no specimens 
were obtained from the worker’s primary care physician at 
the time or immediately following clinical illness. The 4 
cheetahs recovered completely under veterinary care, and a 
convalescent-phase sample, which tested negative by PCR 
and virus isolation, was available for only 1 of the 2 earliest 
affected cheetahs (animal B).
Reverse zoonotic transmission by fomites from 
contact with an ill animal caregiver is the highly likely 
scenario for transmission within the cheetah’s restricted 
environment. Whole-genome sequence analysis showed 
a single-pair mismatch and 100% amino acid identity 
between the virus isolated from the cheetah and the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus isolated from humans. In 
addition, the similar data generated from experimentally 
inoculated ferrets suggest direct transmission of the virus 
rather than an evolutionary event necessary for species 
adaptation. The pandemic inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) virus has 
been shown to have a high replication rate and expanded 
tissue tropism pattern that differ from those for seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza viruses (4), which may help explain the observed 
interspecies transmission of the virus to the cheetah in the 
reported absence of direct human-animal contact. In the 
subsequent 2 years, naturally acquired disease has been 
reported in 10 domestic and wildlife animal species (5), 
including the cheetah reported here.
This case demonstrates the need for a close 
collaboration between public health and veterinary health 
agencies in monitoring and understanding the transmission 
potential of zoonotic infectious agents, including pandemic 
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Figure. Virus concentration (50% tissue 
culture infectious dose) in nasal secretions 
of 3 groups of ferrets (5 animals/group) 
experimentally infected with different 
strains of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. In all 
3 groups, viral shedding was detected on 
days 3 and 5, with the virus being cleared 
by day 7. NW, nasal wash.
Table. Clinical and virologic course of infection in 3 groups of ferrets experimentally infected with different strains of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus, by strain* 
Virus
Average maximum % 
weight loss (range) 
Average maximum increase 
in temperature, °C  Observed clinical signs 
A/Cheetah/CA/D0912239/2010  6.2 (2.3–10.3)  0.9 (0.9–2.7)  Sneezing (2 animals),  
nasal discharge (1 animal) 
A/Ukraine/N6/2009  4.6 (2.8–7.1)  1.2 (0.9, 1.5)  None 
A/TN/892/2009  7.0 (3.5–11.0)  1.4 (1.2–1.8)  None 
*Five ferrets in each group were intranasally inoculated with a 10
5.5 50% tissue culture infectious dose of virus. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Captive Cheetah
(H1N1) 2009 virus, that can be transmitted from animals to 
humans and from humans to animals.
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